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ABSTRACT 
The importance of facilitating the increase of Internet diffusion has become widely recognized 
by the policymakers in transition and developing countries. A wider use of the Internet will 
foster both economic and political development. Based on the case studies of Estonia and 
Slovenia, this article proposes that the best way to encourage Internet diffusion in transition and 
developing economies is through the privatization of an incumbent telecom company and the 
opening of a telecom market. To secure maximum openness and fair play in the telecom sector a 
truly independent telecom regulatory agency has to be established. Telecom regulators need to 
become more similar to central banks in their regulatory independence and stay free of political 
interventions. In order for this to be successful, this article recommends that these policies be 
combined with a liberal trade and a foreign direct investment regime.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Estonia and Slovenia stand out when compared to countries in the Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), having the highest Internet penetration1 rates in the region. Furthermore, not only have 
they been able to adopt the use of Internet quicker than many other CEE countries, Estonia and 
Slovenia have even outperformed half of the member countries of the European Union (EU). 
Considering the transformation in the 1990s and 2000s from a command economy to a market 
economy in Estonia and Slovenia, their success in the Internet diffusion poses a challenging 
public policy puzzle. The relevance of the issue is not only limited to Estonia and Slovenia; 
putting together pieces of this puzzle can lead to fascinating lessons for other transition and 
developing economies by providing a better understanding of policies that facilitate the diffusion 
of information technology. Why have these two countries with substantially different economic 
policies and paths of transition achieved the same outcome in per capita Internet penetration 
rates. 
 Slovenia, for example, inherited the best economic starting position in Central and 
Eastern Europe. The Yugoslav brand of socialism was much milder than in any other part of the 
Eastern bloc. Slovenia, in particular, benefited from this looser economic control, gaining 
Western technology transfer as well as engagement in international trade. By the 1970s, it had 
the most advanced telecom infrastructure in Eastern Europe and a strong IT-skill base started to 
emerge. Currently, Slovenia’s per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of U.S.$ 9,400 is 
significantly higher than that of any other applicant country and equals that of the EU’s poorest 
countries. Its economic transition in the 1990s allows characterizing Slovenia as a “gradual 
transformer”, which used incremental changes to better exploit its advantageous starting position. 
  
Hence, Slovenia’s high per capita Internet penetration rate is an outcome of its wealth and 
advanced starting position.  
 Whereas in the case of Estonia, prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the transfer of 
Western technologies was not possible due to the export controls of NATO members and Japan. 
Its rapid utilization of Western technologies and emergence of new infrastructure were outcomes 
of a radical economic opening and reform of its public sector. Free market reforms in the 1990s 
in Estonia consisted of a very liberal foreign direct investment regime, unilateral free trade, and 
low taxes. Most importantly, with a per capita GDP two and a half times lower than that of 
Slovenia, Estonia demonstrates that the Internet can be diffused and utilized in countries with 
different levels of wealth.  
Interestingly, these highly different economic policies of both countries yielded the same 
result in per capita Internet penetration rates. This article aims to analyze the factors that 
contributed to this outcome. First an outline of the characteristics of the Internet diffusion in the 
CEE will be presented. Second, an assessment the characteristics of public policies of Estonia 
and Slovenia will be made. On the basis of these comparisons, the article will then develop 
policy recommendations for increasing Internet diffusion transition and developing countries.  
INTERNET DIFFUSION IN THE CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Policymakers in transition and developing countries who aim to increase the level of Internet 
diffusion in their respective countries are eager to draw policy lessons from Western Europe, the 
United States, and Japan. However, Internet diffusion in these countries is a product of broader 
social, political, and economic progress. Developed countries had decades to build up societies 
that, to a greater or lesser extent, facilitate the diffusion of new technologies. Furthermore, by 
looking at the EU average of Internet diffusion indicators and those of former European 
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Communist countries, the EU is far ahead of the CEE. But a digital divide exists within the EU 
and within the CEE, which complicates the issue further. In his study The New Economy in 
Europe (1992-2001), Italian economist Francesco Daveri states that two-thirds of EU citizens 
live in the countries where Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) are as diffused 
as in the United States, but one-third live in the countries that are slow ICT adopters (Daveri 
2002, 1).  
 In spring 2003 the European Commission acknowledged this fact by inviting three 
applicant countries (Estonia, Malta, and Slovenia) to move from the eEurope+ program to the 
eEurope program (European Union 2003). The eEurope+ program aims to develop the 
information society in applicant countries of the EU. The eEurope program, in contrast, is meant 
to encourage member states in developing an information society.2 Hence, this is an official 
recognition that a large digital divide exists among the applicants despite their many similarities 
in overall development—and that some applicant countries (such as Estonia and Slovenia) are 
actually at the same level of Internet diffusion as EU members.  
TABLE 1. NUMBER OF INTERNET USERS PER 10,000 INHABITANTS IN EU MEMBER STATES AND 
SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE CEE FROM 1999 TO 2002.3 
 
   COUNTRY      2000 2001 2002 
   Austria 3,325 3,194 4,094 
   Belgium 2,923 3,104 3,286 
   Bulgaria 528 746 897 
   Croatia 669 559 1,629 
   Czech Republic 973 1,360 2,465 
   Denmark 3,921 5,403 4,652 
   Estonia 2,721 3,004 4,133 
   Finland 3,723 4,303 5,089 
   France 1,437 2,638 3,138 
   Germany 3,015 3,736 4,241 
   Greece 947 1,321 1,547 
   Hungary 715 1,484 1,576 
   Ireland 1,793 2,331 2,709 
   Italy 2,304 2,827 3,011 
   Latvia 619 723 1,331 
   Lithuania 609 679 1,445 
 3
  
   Luxembourg 2,281 2,461 3,675 
   Netherlands 4,379 4,905 5,304 
   Poland 725 984 984 
   Portugal 2,494 3,494 3,556 
   Romania 357 447 806 
   Slovakia 939 1,248 1,604 
   Slovenia 1,508 3,008 4,008 
   Spain 1,367 1,827 1,931 
   Sweden 4,558 5,163 5,731 
   UK 2,644 3,995 4,062 
 
 Most importantly, the paths of Estonia and Slovenia have been radically different in their 
transition from the socialist model to the market economy. Therefore, the same outcome in 
Internet diffusion has been achieved through different means. Methodologically, these two cases 
are comparable given their relatively similar size, close proximity to Western Europe, and 
relatively high economic openness. Therefore, a comparison of these two countries offers 
practical insight about the public policies that facilitate Internet diffusion.  
While the achievements of Estonia and Slovenia are increasingly recognized among 
policy circles in Europe, their examples are often dismissed as irrelevant for other countries. 
Their geographical proximity to Western Europe is often given as one reason why they are not 
relevant examples for other CEE countries. Geography matters. Estonia has benefited 
tremendously from its closeness to tech-savvy Nordic countries. However, Slovenia’s proximity 
to Italy and Austria can hardly explain its success as neither is particularly known for being 
technology-orientated. Furthermore, most EU candidate countries are relatively close to Western 
Europe and some are also close to respective Nordic countries. However, Internet diffusion in 
other EU candidate countries is two or three times lower than that in Estonia and Slovenia.  
 Another counterargument to the relevance of Estonia and Slovenia is the small size of 
both countries.4 Though, policy literature on the diffusion of Internet does not address the size of 
economies as a key variable in determining the Internet diffusion, a recent book addresses the 
question indirectly. The Size of Nations by Alberto Alesina of Harvard University and Enrico 
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Spolaore of Brown University, indicates that the ten richest countries in terms of per capita GDP 
in the world are all small (or even very small) with the exception of the United States (Alesina 
and Spolaore 2003). Since several other policy articles conclude that wealth is a key determinant 
of Internet diffusion rates (see discussion in the following paragraph), a correlation between size 
of countries and Internet diffusion can be established.  
Alesina and Spolaore (2003) argue that it may be harder in larger countries to formulate 
policy because preferences of the population in such states are more heterogeneous. Logically, it 
would follow that with populations of 1.4 million and 2 million, respectively, Estonia and 
Slovenia, have been able to change more quickly as a result of their small size, which facilitates 
easier adaptation. However, if size were truly a crucial factor in achieving positive policy 
outcomes, then the world would be full of wonderful small countries, indeed. Correlation, 
however, does not necessarily imply causation. Furthermore, there are several relatively small 
countries in the CEE, such as Latvia, Lithuania, and Slovakia, which differ greatly in terms of 
Internet diffusion rates despite their relatively close location to Western Europe. Evidently, the 
resources of small countries are also in proportion with the size of their population.  
 Wealth is another often-cited determinant of Internet diffusion. But even if per capita 
GDP is a good general indicator of Internet diffusion in some countries, it does not help to 
explain the outcomes showcased in Estonia and Slovenia. First, Estonia’s per capita GDP is 
U.S.$ 3,800 while Slovenia’s is U.S.$ 9,400 (ITU 2003). Estonia is an outlier as its Internet 
penetration rate is much higher than its per capita GDP might predict. Furthermore, there are 
countries such as Greece with similar per capita GDP level as Slovenia, yet their Internet 
penetration rates are two times less than that in Slovenia.  
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The number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants demonstrates the state of 
infrastructure development, a factor that is helpful for facilitating Internet diffusion. Several 
researchers have demonstrated that so-called teledensity5 is crucial for determining outcomes in 
the Internet diffusion rates (Beilock and Dimitrova 2003). However, the differences in the 
diffusion of main telephone lines are not great among the EU candidate countries. As the 
following table indicates, a higher number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants does not 
necessarily mean more Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants. Compared with other CEE 
countries, Estonia and Slovenia have significantly higher Internet penetration rates but similar 
rates of diffusion of main lines. For example, Hungary has 37 main lines per 100 inhabitants, 
which is more than Estonia’s 35 but less than Slovenia’s 40. However, the rate of Internet 
diffusion in Hungary is two times smaller than in Estonia and Slovenia.  
TABLE 2. MAIN TELEPHONE LINES PER 100 INHABITANTS AND NUMBER OF INTERNET USERS 
PER 10,000 INHABITANTS IN EU MEMBER COUNTRIES AND SELECTED CEE COUNTRIES 2001.6  
 
COUNTRY INTERNETUSERS TEL. 
LINES 
COUNTRY INTERNET 
USERS 
TEL. 
LINES 
  Austria 3,194 47   Latvia 723 31 
  Belgium 2,799 49   Lithuania 679 31 
  Bulgaria 746 36   Luxembourg 2,266 78 
  Czech Rep 1,363 37   Netherlands 3,292 63 
  Denmark 4,472 72   Poland 983 30 
  Estonia 3,005 35   Portugal 3,494 43 
  Finland 4,303 55   Romania 447 18 
  France 2,638 57   Slovakia 1,203 29 
  Germany 3,645 64   Slovenia 3,008 40 
  Greece 1,321 53   Spain 1,827 43 
  Hungary 1,484 37   Sweden 5,163 74 
  Ireland 2,331 49   UK 3,995 59 
  Italy 2,758 47 
 
 
 
Thus wealth, geography, and infrastructure are not plausible explanations of Internet 
diffusion rates in Estonia and Slovenia. The exceptionalism of these two cases encourages us to 
look at their public policies of the 1990s and investigate how these policies may have affected 
Internet diffusion outcomes. The support for this approach can be found in policy literature. 
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Dasgupta et al (2001) demonstrate that competition policy matters a great deal because low-
income countries with high World Bank ratings for competition policy have a significantly 
higher number of Internet subscriptions per main telephone line. Therefore, “feasible reforms 
could sharply narrow the digital divide during the next decade for many countries…” (Dasgupta 
et al 2001, 15).  
An essential element of effective competition policy in the telecom sector is the 
establishment of an independent regulatory agency. The higher the independence of regulators is 
from political interventions, the more effective the regulator will be in ensuring the fairness to 
market entrants and the more effective the competition will be (Taylor 2002). This is particularly 
important if the state is an owner or a sole owner of the incumbent telecom company which 
creates conflicts of interests and temptations for politicians to intervene in competition policy for 
the benefit of vested interests. As Heimler writes “by placing ‘distance’ between regulators and 
regulated companies, there is a gain in transparency, but also in the efficiency of the controlling 
function” (Heimler 2000, 189). Such an independent regulatory agency is crucial for reducing 
collective action costs in implementing sound competition policy. 
 In addition to the importance of the regulatory framework of the telecom sector, broader 
economic policy frameworks also impact technology diffusion. An underlying theme in trade 
policy literature is that trade protectionism reduces the benefits of technology transfer for small 
countries (Dollar 1993, 434). It also decreases adoption incentives created by network, market, 
and power externalities (Besley and Case 1993, 399). However, openness reduces transaction 
costs for facilitating the initial diffusion of the Internet and bolsters the competitive ways of 
using the network, which in turn, increases innovative uses and further diffuses the Internet. 
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Thus, an open economic environment, resulting from a liberal Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
regime and free trade, is directly linked to the open nature of the Internet.  
ESTONIA: A RADICAL REFORMER  
 
In the early 1990s, the local IT community became crucial in setting government policies in IT 
spending, procurement, and use. In 1993, a strategy paper was produced by government officials, 
IT specialists, and scientists with the sole aim of establishing the principles for the management 
of modern, well-functioning state information systems. A special IT department of central 
government was formed, and the central government budget included a single category entitled 
“number 37” for all IT expenditures of different government agencies. Government IT 
procurement was consequently unified, and new government purchases had a positive impact on 
the Estonian IT market. Since 1996, Internet-related issues have been a source of increasing 
public interest in Estonia (Ott and Siil 2003).  
However, the Estonian government’s policies were not sector specific. In the 1990s, it did 
not engage in industrial policies that would target the ICT sector or companies directly. 
Government interest, procurement, and promotion of ICT certainly benefited domestic ICT 
companies, such as Microlink, as well as from foreign firms that had entered the Estonian market. 
The overall incentives for such widespread ICT adoption and use by the government should be 
seen in the context of radical reforms that Estonia implemented in the 1990s rather than as an 
outcome of special interests. ICT offered one of the means for the youthful government of free 
marketers, under the premiership of Mart Laar, to increase public sector effectiveness and 
demonstrate the government’s progressiveness in the early 1990s. It was a period of 
“extraordinary politics,” as former Polish finance minister and current governor of the Central 
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Bank of Poland, Leszek Balcerowics described the utilization of window of opportunity by 
radical reformers who enjoyed strong public support (Balcerowics 1995, 4, 145-165).  
 The collapse of the Soviet Union led to what Joseph Schumpeter called “[a] creative 
destruction” (Schumpeter 1975, 81-86). This allowed Estonia’s new elite to execute several 
radical reforms, such as flat income tax and unilateral free trade, without courting interest groups 
(Feldmann andand Sally 2001, 13-14). Indirectly, the government’s radical privatization policy 
and move to unilateral free trade further facilitated the diffusion of the Internet. Most large 
companies were privatized by the mid-1990s (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 2001, 6). The role of foreign investments was crucial in this process, and were 
combined with the inflow of expertise and technology (Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development 2001, 1-4). The rapid path of trade liberalization in Estonia, which culminated 
in 1995 when a unilateral free trade regime came fully into existence, allowed technology 
transfer to occur.  
 In light of the enforcing interconnection between the open economy and open nature of 
Internet architecture, the privatization process of the incumbent telecom (which is more 
controversial) requires examination. In 1992, the Estonian government signed a concession 
agreement with Telia and Sonera of Sweden and Finland, respectively. A monopoly on fixed-
line telephone calls was bestowed to the incumbent, Eesti Telekom, until the end of 2000 (World 
Trade Organization 1999, 11-12). While most would agree that a monopoly position does not 
create incentives to innovate and offer better quality telephone services to customers, a 
consideration of the broader context within which this monopoly carrier operated challenges 
such simplistic conventional wisdom. First, in 1992 Estonia was a poor ex-Soviet state and 
foreign investors were not exactly knocking on the door begging to enter: it only had 1.4 million 
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inhabitants and  very high risk of political turmoil (e.g., possible ethnic conflict, war with Russia, 
etc.) (Mannik 2002). In exchange for the monopoly, the country was able acquire needed 
investments for building the telecom infrastructure in this investor-unfriendly environment.7 
Also, the potential conflict of interests between the state as a regulator and the state as a 
shareholder is not as much a result of decreased ownership of shares in the incumbent telecom 
company.  
Second, the incumbent telecom company was held accountable throughout its period of 
monopoly. An independent regulator of the telecom sector was set up in 1998 and according to 
the assessment of European Commission the agency was fully independent regulatory authority 
(Commission of European Communities 2002, 90). Increasing the public, government, and 
business interest in ICT issues constituted a considerable pressure. In addition, many Nordic 
investors who entered the Estonian market already had experience in the Nordic markets against 
the same incumbents who now owned Eesti Telekom. The outcome of that pressure is reflected 
in the prices of Internet connection; prices in Estonia were among the lowest in the CEE in 2001 
(eEurope 2003+ 2002, 18).  
Third, the provision of leased lines and alternative infrastructure use was partially 
liberalized before the end of 2000. Estonia had a free market for data transmissions, Internet 
service providers (ISPs), and backbone service providers before the end of the monopoly (ESIS 
1999a). Hence, companies and other large entities were able to overcome barriers imposed by the 
monopoly even before the end of its dominance. On balance, therefore, the monopoly situation in 
the Estonian telecom market demonstrates that benefits were greater than costs. The existence of 
a monopoly from 1992 until the end of 2000 enhanced the nature of the open network; and thus 
also favored the positive externalities of the Internet. Despite the existence of a powerful interest 
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group who could have benefited tremendously from a delay in or complete blocking of 
liberalization, the commitment to open the market to competition prevailed, leading to the most 
competitive telecom market in the CEE.  
SLOVENIA: A GRADUAL TRANSFORMER 
 
In the case of Slovenia, limited technology transfer was possible before the break-up of 
Yugoslavia because the impact of export-control regimes imposed by the members of NATO and 
Japan was not as strong as on the other Eastern Bloc countries (Gray 1999, 104, 106). 
Technology transfer was facilitated by extensive trade relations with Western Europe, mainly 
Germany. Fifty percent of Slovenia’s exports went to the West in the 1989. In the 1990s 
Slovenia gradually increased its share of trade with the EU (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis 
and Development 1998, 56). Trade barriers have been liberalized incrementally, but further 
reduction is required for entering the EU. Even if the change has been slow compared with the 
rest of the CEE, liberalization has had a positive effect on the transfer of technologies throughout 
the 1990s. 
Furthermore, Slovenia started to focus on IT-related research and education, which 
started in the mid-1970s. In the early 1980s, secondary schools began to install mainframe 
computers. In the 1990s, the government also launched specific projects to increase the Internet 
diffusion at schools, public libraries, and research institutions. In addition to educational capacity, 
development of local IT communities was possible as a result of the existence of the local 
technology industry (IskraDelta). Decentralized control of the economy and “social ownership” 
of companies created more incentives for entrepreneurship and innovation than the Soviet 
command economy. Inflow of FDI in the technology sector encouraged the transfer of Western 
technologies further.  
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For example, Siemens established a joint venture with Iskratel in 1989. Slovenia’s early 
ICT orientation allowed fairly sophisticated technology companies to grow and integrate with 
Western clusters (Biegelbauer et al 2001). Currently, many multinationals (Siemens, Cisco, and 
Microsoft) have invested in Slovenia or have partnered with Slovenian companies. In addition, 
the country has a wide range of medium-sized hardware and software companies. Most 
importantly, Slovenian companies hold relatively high positions in the value chains of Western 
multinationals. 
However, in general terms, Slovenia pursued a relatively protectionist and targeted 
policies toward FDI (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 2002, 25). 
Instead of opening entry for all investors on an equal basis, the government discriminated against 
foreign investors in the privatization process and attempted to meddle with direct financial 
incentives instead of following rules of fair play (World Trade Organization 2002, ix, x, 13, and 
26). Hence, the ratio of FDI to GDP remains well below average in the region. The World Trade 
Organization (WTO), Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), 
and other international organizations see the main barriers for FDI in an open privatization policy 
and a stable regulatory environment. Such discriminatory policy can be explained by the gradual 
transition process in which governments run by former apparatchiks of socialist Yugoslavia do 
their best to preserve the social democratic corporatist nature of the country. Protection against 
foreign investments has been used to minimize the negative distributional effects of economic 
change and influenced the restructuring of the telecom sector (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development 2002, 11).  
Throughout the 1990s, the Slovenian government engaged in building a “national 
champion” of the incumbent telecom company. While other CEE countries sold a large stake of 
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their incumbent companies to the strategic investors from the West, the Slovenian government 
still owns 74 percent.8 Particularly the domestic nature of complete ownership rather than just 
state ownership9 has socialized the telecom company business and allowed domestic interest 
groups to gain leverage against privatization. Possible privatization has been a constant topic of 
discussion with the EU, and the decision has not been made as of the writing of this article.  
Similarly, continuous delay has also been a factor in opening the telecom market to 
competition. Slovenia had originally planned to open the market for competition by the end of 
2000 (Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development 1998, 116-117). Slovenia formally 
ended the monopoly in fixed lines over voice telephony by adopting the new 
Telecommunications Act in 2001. However, the act legislated a transition period in the market 
opening in areas of leased lines, the local loop, number portability, and cost-based accounting 
mechanism for operators with significant market power until July 2002 (Commission of the 
European Communities 2001, 67). Hence, the market was not opened until mid-2002, and 
informally the new competitive environment has not ensued because the Telekom Slovenije 
monopoly continues to exist in reality. The regulator of the telecom sector was set up in 2001. 
However, according to the assessment of European Commission in 2003, Slovenia still has to 
strengthen the regulator in order to make the agency truly independent (Commission of the 
European Communities 2003, 35-36). 
In comparison with other countries’ reluctance to open their markets for competition and 
privatize incumbent telecom companies, Slovenia’s performance in the telecom sector has been 
good. First, the number of main lines increased from 31 lines in 1995 to 40 in 2001 (International 
Telecommunications Union 2003). Second, the nature of socialization of ownership—where the 
stakeholders are not a narrow interest group but rather a disperse group of workers, financiers, 
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and business people—has increased the accountability of Telekom Slovenije. This is reflected in 
the prices of Internet connections, which among the least expensive in the CEE region (eEurope 
2003+ 2002, 18). However, the costs of such low prices may have been widely socialized as well.  
Third, Slovenia had formally liberalized the market in data transmissions, but in reality, 
the market was still held by a monopoly. ISP services were partially liberalized but licenses were 
required which increased the cost of entry. Leased lines and alternative infrastructure use was 
partially liberalized (ESIS 1999b). Hence, there were some ways to overcome the power of the 
incumbent but, on balance, the gap between formal and informal rules indicates that the 
monopoly had de facto control not just in the voice telephony but also in the provision of Internet 
connectivity. The need to solve the issue was a part of the rationale that led to the creation of the 
Ministry of Information Society in 2001. The decision to create a special ministry grew out of 
the recognition that a more concentrated effort was needed to coordinate the government’s ICT 
priorities. Some existing relationships between the Ministry of Communication and the 
incumbent telecom company did not encourage reform of the telecom sector.  
COMPARISON OF ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA  
 
By comparing the two afore-mentioned, it is obvious that Slovenia had a better initial starting 
position than Estonia. Slovenia had more advanced infrastructure, mainframe computer 
penetration, and higher personal computer penetration. Furthermore, Slovenia’s ability to trade 
facilitated technology transfers from the West. Whereas, Estonia was part of the closed economic 
system of the Soviet Union and certain technologies (such as mainframe computers) never 
reached the country. Since Internet diffusion is dependent on the availability of existing 
infrastructure and information technologies, Slovenia inherited the best starting position in the 
former Eastern bloc. 
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However, a decade later, Estonia’s Internet diffusion level equaled Slovenia’s. 
Simultaneously, Slovenia progressed tremendously well, comparatively. Estonia’s independence 
from older information technologies, that age relatively quickly, combined with proper public 
policies actually created strength in the adoption of new technologies. Thus dependence on older 
technologies may lead to higher transaction costs affiliated with the adoption of certain new 
technologies. Sometimes building a new house and the renovation of old house may be equally 
costly; at other times building a new one might be even cheaper than renovation of the old.  
 Estonia started as a tabula rasa, which allowed for the bringing in of the newest 
technologies. With combined new investments in infrastructure, diffusion was able to accelerate 
on the basis of a rapid growth rate. Slovenia’s dependence on older technologies created 
disadvantages as the interconnectivity between older and newer technologies is not always 
possible. Such phenomenon is evident in Slovenia’s large number of personal computers that are 
not connected to the Internet. Technically, it may be difficult to implement the connectivity 
between newer and older technologies.  
Most importantly, Slovenia’s and Estonia’s policies towards the encouragement of ICT 
diffusion also reflect the general path of reform and chosen political economy models in the both 
countries. Estonia had a radical, shock-therapy type approach to transition and aimed at creating 
free-market economy. Slovenia chose a gradual reform path and a political economy system 
similar to social democratic corporatism where the public policies are the outcome of national 
consensus among left-leaning governments, industry, and centralized labor unions (Garrett 1998). 
What makes the Slovenian and Estonian cases educational for all countries in general and 
transition countries in particular, is that both nations achieved the highest outcome in Internet 
penetration rates under conditions of monopoly in fixed-line voice telephony. The 2001 Estonian 
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and Slovenian Internet access costs were significantly lower than in the Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, and Slovakia (eEurope+ 2003 2002, 18).  
TABLE 3. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY FRAMEWORK  
OF ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA (1991- 2002) 
 
CHARACTERISTICS ESTONIA SLOVENIA 
 
Initial Starting Position in the 
1990s  
Almost no Western ICT 
technologies; poor 
infrastructure; fairly developed 
technical skills.  
Limited availability of Western 
technologies; basic infrastructure; 
strong IT skill base. 
 
Nature of Transition 
Radical across-the-board 
economic reforms; full 
liberalization of the economy.  
Gradual reforms; incremental opening 
of the economy; many protectionist 
measures. 
Political Economy System Predominantly free market. Typical characteristics of social 
democratic corporatism. 
 
Trade Policy 
Open trader; unilateral free trade 
from 1995-2000.  
Fairly open trader; gradual elimination 
of protectionist measures throughout 
the 1990s.  
 
Foreign Direct Investment 
Regime 
Open non-discriminatory 
regime; rapid privatization; 
foreign participation encouraged. 
Greenfield investments preferred; 
discriminatory towards foreigners; 
domestic investors preferred to 
foreigners in the privatization process.  
Power of Labor Unions  Weak; fragmentized.  Strong; centralized bargaining.  
Dominant Ideology Center-right; free market liberal.  Center-left; social-democratic.  
Privatization of State-Owned 
Enterprises 
Rapid; largest enterprises sold in 
the first half of 1990s.  
Slow; privatization of large enterprises 
started in the late 1990s and is ongoing 
today.  
Industrial policy Non-existent . Direct encouragement of specific 
sectors/firms.  
 
Under monopoly conditions, local calls are usually subsidized by the incumbent telecom 
company at the expense of long-distance calls in order to provide universal service. Therefore, 
the initial diffusion of the Internet (which occurs by dial-up access) can occur relatively cheaply; 
i.e., at the expense of international calls. As long as monopolist local call prices are acceptable 
and quality of service is tolerable, the market opening in fixed calls is not a precondition for 
Internet diffusion. However, such an approach is not sustainable in the long run. The increased 
sophistication of users will raise the demand for more competitive services, which in turn, will 
work against the incumbent and therefore limit the diffusion of the Internet.  
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Hence, opening the market in January 2001 in Estonia and not delaying it like Slovenia, 
seems to be good timing. The market opening increased the prices of using Internet through dial-
up access because the move to cost based prices meant that local telephone services were no-
longer cross subsidized by international telephone calls. Consequently, many users switched to 
broadband access as it became cheaper in relative terms. This in turn, increased the time that 
users spent online and gave incentives for market participants to offer cheaper and more 
innovative services than before.  
TABLE 4. KEY CHARACTERISTICS OF THE TELECOM SECTOR  
IN ESTONIA AND SLOVENIA (1991-2002) 
 
CHARACTERISTICS ESTONIA SLOVENIA 
Privatization of Telecom     
Company 
49 percent privatized in 1992; 
government’s stake reduced to 27 
percent in 1997.  
Owned by state and state controlled 
investment funds; 13 percent of shares 
belong to employees.  
Nature of Ownership International and domestic;  
Nordic state-owned telecoms; Estonian 
state; private investors; investment 
funds.  
Dominantly domestic; Slovenian state 
owns 74 percent; employees own 13 
percent; remainder belongs to state and 
domestic investment funds.  
Monopoly of Fixed-line 
Services  
Monopoly ended at the end of 2000.  Monopoly was supposed to end by the 
end of 2000 but was constantly delayed 
and transitional arrangements were 
granted until mid-2002.  
Leased Lines Partially liberalized before 2001; 
completely liberalized after 2001.  
Partially liberalized before 2001.  
ISP Services Free market. License required throughout the 1990s 
(not anymore). 
Data Transmissions Free market. Formally liberalized; monopoly in 
reality 
 
Governance 
Ministry of Telecom represents the 
state in the company; independent 
regulator oversees.  
Ministry of telecom represents the state 
in the company; independent regulator 
oversees; Special Ministry of 
Information Society set up in 2001.  
Prices of Internet Access Among the lowest in the CEE Among the lowest in the CEE.  
 
 
This ability to maintain relatively low prices for telecom services in Estonia and Slovenia 
indicate that the Slovenian and Estonian governments were able to keep the incumbent telecom 
company accountable, at least to a greater extent than other CEE countries. On balance, 
uncertainty in market opening and privatization of telecom in Slovenia reflects a higher degree of 
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regulatory capture of government policies by vested interests than in Estonia. A desire to 
minimize the negative effects of changing economic environment did not allow delivering the 
positive impact of “creative destruction” by wiping out the informal networks of the socialist era. 
That Slovenia had 179 Internet hosts per 10,000 inhabitants in 2002, demonstrates the existence 
of higher barriers for entry. At the same time, Estonia had 468 hosts; almost three times higher 
than Slovenia (International Telecommunications Union 2003). This indicates that there are 
structural impediments on the supply side in Slovenia.  
 Estonia’s experience suggests that the market opening of the telecom sector is more 
achievable under the existence of diverse interest groups rather than a centralized national 
bargaining system. Economic openness of Estonia increased competitive pressures, rendered the 
dominance of narrow interests unlikely. Slovenia’s engagement in selective protectionism —
where trade openness was preferred to FDI and foreign ownership—and the social democratic 
corporatist nature of the country blocked the opening of telecom sector constantly. As Slovenia’s 
initial starting position was much better than Estonia’s, then obviously Estonia’s more radical 
approach in changing the formal rules of the game reduced the transaction costs in Internet 
diffusion. Certainly, Slovenia has progressed rapidly as well. 
However, the country has benefited from the heritage of the previous system and the 
advancement of Internet diffusion could have been even greater with higher levels of 
competition in the telecom market. Involvement of diverse investors could have reduced 
inefficiencies in allocation of capital. For instance, Slovenia has more main telephone lines than 
Estonia, because the country has invested more money into infrastructure development. But as 
similar Internet diffusion rates demonstrate, such a high number of main lines is not necessary.  
 RECOMMENDATIONS  
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In general terms, these case studies demonstrate that transition and developing economies should 
open telecom market for competition immediately and concurrently privatize incumbent telecom 
companies. In order to ensure maximum benefits of such a change, such policies should be 
combined with a liberal foreign direct investment regime in both the telecom sector and other 
areas of the economy. Such openness would help to attract firms with diverse interests to the 
economy and would make it difficult for one interest group to dominate policymaking through 
regulatory capture.  
ADVANCED TRANSITION ECONOMIES JOINING THE EU    
The key lesson of Estonia and Slovenia is that more advanced transition economies should 
strengthen regulatory regimes by establishing a regulatory agency with a high degree of 
independence and ability to secure the fair play in the market. It is obvious that for transition 
countries in the CEE joining the European Union in 2004 or 2007, the telecommunication 
legislation of the EU means market liberalization in conjunction with setting up a stronger 
regulatory regime (Heimler 2000, 185-186). Formally, all of these countries liberalized their 
markets by 2003. However, informally many barriers for competitive market are still in place. 
The key is to increase the accountability of the incumbent telecom company and to try to keep 
the prices of telecom services down by ensuring a competitive market environment by sound 
regulation. Estonia achieved this outcome by allowing diverse ICT companies to enter the 
market while incrementally strengthening its regulatory capacity. Most importantly, the case 
studies demonstrate that privatization of state-owned telecoms increases competitive pressures 
and reduces the possibilities for political interference.  
Slovenia was able to overcome the negative externalities of state ownership and 
monopoly power of its incumbent telecom company due to the social democratic corporatist 
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nature of the country where diverse domestic interests and stakeholders were involved. However, 
Slovenia is exceptional for purposes of drawing recommendations. More advanced transition 
economies can learn more from Estonia. Though they have missed the opportunity for curbing 
the power of incumbent company monopoly in the manner of Estonia, they can achieve the same 
outcome by implementing a regulatory framework that secures a higher degree of competition in 
the market, which will, in turn, decrease prices of telecom services.  
Concretely, policymakers should create an independent regulatory agency and appoint 
key, long-tenured decision-makers to it. Effective and independent regulation is especially 
important when a country is transforming from a monopoly in fixed-line telecom services to full 
competition. Market dominance may help the incumbent telecom company abuse the system via 
rent-seeking and keeping entry barriers high. Whereas diversity of potential market 
participants—achieved through economic openness—minimizes the risk of predatory behavior 
by the incumbent. A strong regulatory agency implies more than just a simple telecom regulator. 
In many ways it should operate as an independent central bank that has control over monetary 
policy without political interference.  
LESS ADVANCED TRANSITION AND DEVELOPING ECONOMIES 
 
Of the two case studies, the Estonian experience is more relevant for less advanced developing 
and transition countries. By partially opening their markets, limiting an monopoly, privatizing 
their incumbent company, and creating a liberal FDI regime, these countries can increase rates of 
Internet diffusion. Unintended consequences of monopoly in voice telephony should be 
recognized. In addition, some countries could benefit by immediately opening their market for 
competition 
 20
  
The governments of less advanced transition economies should open their telecom 
market partially for competition and set a firm deadline for a complete market opening. If a 
country is capital-poor and needs a significant investment in infrastructure, like Estonia in the 
early 1990s, sustaining a monopoly of fixed lines or partial monopoly (for example, in rural 
areas) can advance the telecom infrastructure. Such commitment to an open market will 
completely be “locked in” through the engagement of international organizations such as WTO 
and/or via domestic, constitutional means. Furthermore, in combination with a gradual market 
opening, a country could raise extra cash that could be directed towards infrastructure 
development via incremental privatization of an incumbent telecom company. In such a case, the 
establishment of a liberal FDI regime in conjunction with privatization and gradual liberalization 
could attract additional investors to the telecom service industry which would create pressure to 
keep the monopoly accountable. 
The key in such a case, is the avoidance of regulatory capture by the incumbent company 
which could delay the market opening. Hence, the diversity of different interests in this scenario, 
is more crucial than the creation of a regulatory agency. Here, the main aim of a regulating 
agency is to set price controls for services that are offered under monopoly conditions. 
Furthermore, the government should encourage Internet diffusion by offering government 
services online, which would create additional incentives for using the Internet.  
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CONCLUSION 
 
The comparison of these two cases contributes to policy literature on Internet diffusion and 
political economy of reform by offering insights into the public policies of two advanced 
transition economies. On the economic side, the Internet can deliver tremendous productivity 
gains. Hence, transition and developing countries are trying to create suitable environments for 
the diffusion of this technology. Estonia and Slovenia offer broad lessons demonstrating that it 
would be naive to assume that a specific Internet policy without changes in the larger framework 
of policies will help to increase Internet diffusion. Both cases suggest that the increase in Internet 
diffusion is linked to broader economic and political framework. Slovenia’s high rate of Internet 
penetration, for instance, is explained by its path-dependence derived from the former system 
and ability of its gradual reform process to sustain such diffusion.  
 Estonia’s example is particularly relevant for policy reform in transition and developing 
countries. Often in these countries the commitment to promote Internet diffusion falls apart when 
serious reforms—such as liberalizing the telecom sector and ensuring a fair competition in the 
market—need to be carried out. It should be recognized, however, that Estonia’s success in 
encouraging Internet diffusion owes much to the radical reforms that occurred in the country 
throughout the 1990s, which created an extremely open economy that allocated the adoption of 
the Internet. Most importantly, a regulatory framework was set in place that allowed the securing 
of more fair play in the market than in other transition economies. Evidence of this is that 
Estonia had some of the lowest Internet access costs in the region in 2001. This is demonstrated 
by its significantly higher number of Internet hosts than in any other state in Central and Eastern 
Europe.  
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The importance of Internet diffusion is usually cited in the punch line of policy programs 
that stress the need “to move toward a knowledge-based economy,” depict the ideal nature of an 
“Information Society”, and articulate concerns about the “digital divide.” Certainly, the role of 
Internet and the number of people in an economy connected to the Internet are not just symbolic, 
but differ in substance. The Internet can be an important force behind political and economic 
development, as it reduces transaction costs for the flow of information. Thus, it can have a 
profound impact on democratization. All nations interested in this end goal should therefore 
prioritize the exploration and implementation of mechanisms that facilitate Internet diffusion in 
transition and developing economies. 
 
NOTES 
 
1 The terms Internet penetration and Internet diffusion will be used interchangeably for the purposes of this article. 
In the context of the article, Internet diffusion refers to number of Internet users in a country per 10,000 inhabitants. 
All the data concerning the number of Internet users per 10,000 inhabitants is collected from the various sections of 
the International Telecommunications Union website.  
2  The eEurope program is an outcome of European Council meeting in Lisbon on March 23-24, 2000. eEurope 
Action Plan was adopted by European Commission in May 2000. Necessity to have separate eEurope+ program for 
applicant countries was recognized at the European Ministerial Conference in Warsaw on 11-12May 2000. The 
Lisbon meeting set objectives for the EU to “become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world (eEurope+ 2003, 5). The existence of two separate programs is based on understanding that the level of 
development is different in the EU and in applicant countries. Therefore, problems are different as well. “EU 
candidate countries are faced with enormous challenges in their attempt to catch up with the development of a 
knowledge-based economy...” (eEurope+ 2003, 5). 
3 Data was collected from the differnent documents published on the website of ITU during the years 2002-2003  
(http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/). Namely, information technology statistics published by ITU on 9 October 
2003 and 12 December 2002 was used. All numbers are rounded up to closest whole number.  
4 The argument that small size allows Estonia and Slovenia to diffuse the Internet to a greater extent than bigger 
countries was a common counterargument presented to the author during the presentation of his research on various 
occasions. Examples include a Politics and Information Systems conference in Orlando, Florida, in July 2003 and a 
lecture at the Central European University in Budapest in March 2003. Also, this comment has been made during 
numerous interviews by author with policymakers in the CEE and informal discussions.  
5 Usually defined as a number of main telephone lines per 100 inhabitants.  
6 The figures come from the ITU website where the key indicators of ICT diffusion are given. However, in order to 
simplify the figures have been rounded to the nearest whole number 
7 The benefits of investments in exchange for monopoly are clear. In the early 1990s, most telephone lines in Estonia 
were analogue lines. By 2001 over 70 percent of lines had been digitalized (International Telecommunications 
Union 2003). By comparison, the Soviet Union had on average 9.7 lines per 100 inhabitants in 1989 (Business Week 
1989). The number of main lines in Estonia was significantly higher than in the Soviet Union but still not sufficient 
for providing telephone connection to everybody who wanted it.7 Hence, investment in main lines by the privatized 
incumbent telecom company was crucial. In 1995, the number of main lines in Estonia was 27.7 lines per 100 
inhabitants. By 2001, the number increased to 35.2 (International Telecommunications Union 2003). 
8 Employees own 13 percent while state investment funds the remaining share of Telekom Slovenije. 
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9 In many privatized telecom companies the state is still an important shareholder and many state or partially state-
owned telecom companies privatize telecom companies in other countries. 
 
REFERENCES 
 
Alesina, Enrico and Enrico Spolaore. 2003. The Size of Nations. Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Balcerowicz, Leszek. 1995. Socialism, Capitalism, and Transformation. Budapest: Central European 
University Press. 
 
Beilock, Richard and Dimitrova V. Daniela. 2003. “An Exploratory Model of Inter-country Internet 
Diffusion.” Telecommunications Policy 27 (April/May):3-4. 
 
Besley, Timothy and Anne Case. 1993. “Modeling Technology Adoption in Developing Countries.” 
The American Economic Review 83 (May) : 2. 
 
Biegelbauer, Peter, Erich Griessler, and Margit Leuthold. 2001. “The Impact of Foreign Direct 
Investment on the Knowledge Base of Central and Eastern European Countries.” Political Science 
Series. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies. June. 
 
Business Week. 1989. “The East Bloc’s $ 100 Billion Phone Bill.” November 20.  
 
Commission of the European Communities. 2001. “Regular Report on Slovenia’s Progress Towards 
Accession.” (http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2001/si_en.pdf) 
 
___________2002. “Regular Report on Estonia’s Progress Towards Accession.” 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/ee_en.pdf) 
 
_________2003. “Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Slovenia’s Preparations for Membership.” 
(http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_2003/pdf/cmr_si_final.pdf) 
 
Dasgupta, Susmita, Somik Lall and David Wheeler. 2001. “Policy Reform, Economic Growth and 
Digital Divide: An Econometric Analysis.” The World Bank. March 28.  
(http://econ.worldbank.org/files/1615_wps2567.pdf). 
  
Daveri, Francesco. 2002. “The New Economy in Europe (1992-2001).” Helsinki: Paper Prepared for 
the WIDER Conference on The New Economy in Development. May . 
 
Dollar, David. 1993. “Technological Differences as a Source of Comparative Advantage.” The 
American Economic Review 83 (May):2.  
 
eEurope 2003 +. 2002. “A Report Prepared by the EU Membership Candidate Countries with the 
Assistance of the European Commission.” Ljubljana: European Ministerial Conference (June 3-4).  
 
ESIS. 1999a. “Master Report About Estonia.” Information Society Project Office of European 
Commission. (http://www.eu-esis.org/esis2reg/EEregh.htm). 
 
  
 25
                                                                                                                                                             
_____1999b. “Master Report About Slovenia.” Information Society Project Office of European 
Commission. (http://www.eu-esis.org/esis2reg/SIregh.htm). 
 
European Union. 2003. “Three Accession Countries Invited to Join the eEurope Programme.”  
eGovernment News. 30 
April.(http://europa.eu.int/ISPO/ida/jsps/index.jsp?fuseAction=showDocumentanddocumentID=1049
andparent=chapterandpreChapterID=0-140-194). 
 
Feldmann, Magnus and Razeen Sally. 2001. “From the Soviet Union to the European Union: 
Political Economy of Estonian Trade Policy Reforms, 1991-2000.” Bank of Finland. 
BOFIT Online 1 (January). (http://www.bof.fi/bofit/eng/7online/abs/pdf/bon0101.pdf ). 
 
Garrett, Geoffrey. 1998. Partisan Politics in the Global Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
 
Gray, Gavin.1999. “Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia.” Central and Eastern 
Europe Handbook. Patrick Heenan (ed.) Chicago: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. 
 
Heimler, Alberto. 2000. “Competition and Regulation of Public Utilities: Privatization, Competition 
and Regulation.” Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Proceedings. Paris: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.  
 
Institute of Macroeconomic Analysis and Development. 1998. “Strategy of the Republic of Slovenia 
for Accession to the European Union: Economic and Social Part.” Ljubljana: JA Grafika.  
 
International Telecommunications Union. 2003. “Statistics of main Telephone Lines and Internet 
Users.” (http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/). 
 
Mannik, Jaan. 2002. Presentation at the Seminar in the Estonian Business School. May 13.  
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2001. “Foreign Direct Investment in 
Estonia: Experiences and Perspectives.” Global Forum in International Investment: New Horizons 
and Policy Challenges for the Foreign Direct Investment in the 21st Century. Mexico City, Mexico: 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. November 26-27. 
 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 2002. Foreign Direct Investment in 
Slovenia: Trends and Prospects. Paris: Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs. 
(January)  
 
Ott, Arvo and Imre Siil. 2003. “Eesti e-riik tulgu.” Eesti Päevaleht. February 7. 
(http://www.epl.ee/artikkel.php?ID=227214). 
 
Schumpeter, Joseph A. 1975. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy. New York: Harper Perennial.  
 
Taylor, Martyn. 2002. “Reforming China’s Telecommunications Laws: Lessons from the Australian 
Experience?” International Journal of Communications Law and Policy. 7:3 
 
  
 26
                                                                                                                                                             
World Trade Organization. 1999. “The Republic of Estonia. Schedule of Specific Commitments. 
GATS/SC/127. Annex 1.” Reference Paper (Additional Commitments by Estonia in Trade in 
Telecommunication Services as of Six Months from Estonia’s Accession to the WTO). October 5.  
 
World Trade Organization. 2002. “Trade Policy Review. Slovenia. Report by the Secretariat.” 
April15. (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp_rep_e.htm#slovenia2002). 
 
